Is Accra a Superstar City?
A recent study of house price behavior in U.S. cities, by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) raises questions about so-called superstar cities in which housing is so inelastically supplied that it becomes unaffordable, as higher-income families outbid residents. We consider the case of Accra, Ghana in this light, estimating the elasticity of housing supply and discussing the implications for growth and income distribution.
There is not a great deal of data available to examine trends in Accra's, so our method is indirect. First, we use a variant of the traditional mono-centric city model to calculate Accra's housing supply elasticity relative to those of other similarly-sized African cities. This suggests that housing supply responsiveness is much higher elsewhere. This muted supply responsiveness is consistent with the observed higher housing prices. Second, we estimate a number of traditional housing demand and reduced form equations. Placing a number of restrictions on the equations allows us to infer Accra's housing supply elasticity.
Taken together, our approaches suggest that lower income families in Accra have such poor housing conditions because the market is extremely unresponsive to demand. Although the outcomes we have traced --high housing prices and low quality-are not unusual relative to the other developed country superstar cities, they are extreme. The welfare costs are considerable, so much so that in addition to direct housing market effects, these policies also appear to have potentially significant implications for the achievement of more equitable growth.
I. Introduction
Over the past 15 years Ghana has been one of the most rapidly growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This growth has been aided immeasurably by Ghana experiencing high levels of remittances, which while difficult to measure undoubtedly exceed development aid and foreign direct investment 1 These remittances, in turn, have been driven by the country's benign and improving policy environment --one in which the average rate of inflation fell from among the highest in Africa to about 10 percent over the last few years --and the relatively large Disapora of Ghanaians who live abroad. 2 While statistics on how these remittances are invested are not available, a number of articles, Quartey (2006) , Yeboah (2000) and Diko and Tipple (1991) , a drive around Accra, discussions with bankers and developers there, as well as local newspaper accounts, all indicate that real estate investments in the capital city account for a significant share of the high level of GDP received in remittances.
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At the same time, housing in Accra has become more expensive, and appears to be increasingly pricing middle and lower income groups out of the housing market, resulting in substandard and congested living conditions for a large majority of the city's residents. This pattern suggests a number of possible mysteries: First, given the high and growing level of investments in Accra's real estate, why is it the case that the housing conditions of the poor in Accra are considerably worse than those of the poor in a number of other African cities which have lower incomes, as shown both by Konadu-Agymang (1990) and our data? And second, is this pattern is similar to that observed in the U.S.
cities, referred to as "Superstar Cities," by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) , in which the growth in the number of higher income families in cities with inelastic housing supply results in these families outbidding lower income families, driving up the price of the underlying land? Finally, are these mysteries related? That is, could Accra's real estate boom lead to both deteriorating housing conditions for many, as well as have broader adverse effects on the economy?
While this last question is perhaps the most intractable, it is also the most important as the situation in Accra is by no means an isolated case. Rapid house price escalation has characterized many cities across the world besides Accra, and particularly cities in emerging economies which have achieved higher levels of growth, such as India, China, and the EU-accession countries among others.
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This paper attempts to shed some light on these mysteries. It examines the effects policies have on house prices in Accra, showing how these factors not only adversely affect house prices, but also the housing situation of the poor and the broader economy.
4 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) traces through the sharp increases in real house prices in Accra since 1980. House prices in India are similarly interesting in terms of external finance, in this case foreign direct investments. In 2005, foreigners were for the first time allowed to invest in Indian real estate. During the next year, housing prices in most major Indian cities skyrocketed, leading the Reserve Bank of India to undertake a study, by Joshi (2006) , of whether there was a bubble in housing prices in the country. Of course there is an important issue of fungibility of funds that make it extremely difficult to infer how remittances are ultimately used. For instance, unlike most of the earlier literature, Chami et al. (2005) suggest that remittances may well have a negative effect on growth. We do not focus on such macro balance questions. Our focus is on the distributional effects of relative price changes and the effects these changes can have on the ability to reallocate resources across space.
Before discussing our results, however, it is perhaps important to note the limitations of data availability and our corresponding efforts to place the limited data we have into what we hope are theoretically rich but simultaneously simple empirical constructs. To this end, in our analysis of the housing market we draw on two rich traditions: First, we rely on models of mono-centric cities about which Mills and Tan (1980) said:
there are few cases in economics in which such a simple theory leads to so many testable implications… [and which is] based on a functional form that can be derived from respectable theory and tested with easily available data. p.314;
and second, that of development economics more generally, particularly with regard to perspectives on the role played by the housing market in economic growth. In particular,
we take as a point of departure the view of Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis (1977) :
Urbanization is decisive because it is so expensive. The difference between the cost of urban and rural development does not turn on comparing the capital required for factories and that required for farms. Each of these is a small part of total investment, and the difference per head is not always in favor of industry Thus, while we would not put a great deal of confidence in the statistical significance of our empirical results and their coefficients, we nevertheless believe that our findings are fairly clear and consistent with the literature on development and even Ghana's development agenda, as propounded by Lewis (1954) in his theory of economic development.
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Our results are first, that the welfare costs of current sectoral policies are both considerable and regressive; and second, that these policies prevent housing demand increases -as might arise from remittances or improved access to finance --from contributing as much to growth as they could if they were not fueling asset price 5 Lewis won the Nobel for his work on development economics, a significant part of this work was undertaken in Ghana's early years of independence where he was the chief economic advisor to Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first Prime Minister. See Tignor's (2005) biography of Lewis for discussion of the development of his theory and his arguments with Nkrumah.
increases. In other words, housing market constraints appear to feed larger price increases because of sectoral policies which constrain the housing market.
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II. Background
As shown by Adams and Page (2003) the general source of high levels of remittances is the underlying strength of the economy, the credibility of the policy environment, and the size of the Diaspora. Such large resource flows imply a belief in the economy that is absent in many Sub-Saharan economies which have been experiencing the opposite phenomenon -capital flight of almost 4 percent of GDP per year, again see Collier et al (2004) . For Ghana, such resource flows represent an enormous opportunity to sustain and deepen growth. However, these funds are flowing into an economy with a financial system which --due to many years of high inflation and heavy government borrowing -is only now recovering from having been among the more underdeveloped in Africa.
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In such a context, significant asset pricing problems can arise, particularly when the single most important investment available appears to be real estate in the capital city, Accra. Such investment demands undoubtedly contribute to higher real estate prices in the city. However, just how high the prices are is surprising. For instance, a recent ranking of the cost of living in the 150 most expensive cities in the world -driven in large part by real estate prices --placed Accra 75 th between Melbourne and Houston, 7 According to commonly used measure of financial sector development, in 2004 Ghana's financial depth is one-fifth the average sub-Saharan figure, and was lower than that of countries with lower per capita income levels. However, significant improvements in banking sector strength has been realized as shown by the recent performance of all banks meeting prudential capital adequacy requirements and two-thirds of them exceeding these requirements by a significant margin. Ghana's financial depth See Honohan and Beck (2006) . cities in countries with per capita income, even on a purchasing power parity basis, more than ten times higher than Ghana's.
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In other countries such rapid house price increases have been identified as the likely culprit for both the problems of housing affordability and an inability to exploit many of the most productive employment opportunities, besides the Gyourko et al (2006) study of superstar cities, see Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) and Green et al (2006) for the U.S., Cheshire and Sheppard (1989) for the U.K, and Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) for Korea and Malaysia. Williamson (1988) also provides a discussion of these effects during
England's Industrial Revolution as well as for developing countries generally. Moreover, in a country like Ghana, where one city may account for 20 percent of GDP or more, it
would not be surprising if housing cost increases in that city alone could affect the country's growth rate.
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Evidence on Housing Costs and Conditions in Accra. Housing costs in some of Accra's lower income neighborhoods are considerably lower than they are in Accra's exclusive neighborhoods. But then, so too are the income levels. To get a sense of how housing conditions in Accra affect households with different income levels it is necessary to either make detailed surveys of conditions across the city, or to compare Accra's low income housing conditions with those of similarly-situated households in other cities.
Because of data availability we choose the latter approach. This approach has the added (2007) indicates that the rents of Class A offices in Ghana are 40 percent higher than the average for 10 other Sub-Saharan countries, Table 9 .p. 48. Of course the recent increases in utility costs, related to the country's energy problems, contribute to these costs. Nevertheless, even with adjustment for this effect the costs noted remain relatively high, as the discussion of rental payments in the text will show. 9 This assumption about Accra's share of GDP would seem to be conservative as the Greater Accra area has a population of almost 15 percent of the national population and incomes there are considerably higher than elsewhere as discussed later. Below we explore the channels through which these prices increases could affect growth.
advantage of benchmarking Accra's experience with those of a number of other similarly large cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. We compare the housing situation of inner city lowincome neighborhoods in Accra with similar areas in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Addis
Ababa.
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As shown in Table 1 , the mean and median expenditure on housing and services in Accra is much higher than that of similar expenditures in the other cities, yet the housing conditions in Accra are of lower quality and quantity. That is, while the residents of Accra pay much more for housing services, they get considerably less, paying, for example, a much higher share of the household income for some services, such as sanitation. Moreover, not only are costs high, the payment form is onerous. It is not unusual, for instance, for renters in Accra, who account for almost two-thirds of all households in the city, to have to make up-front payments of three years of rent, suggesting an extremely tight housing market. Korboe (1992) for a definition and discussion of the importance of this structural arrangement in Ghanaian housing consumption decisions.
This sort of housing deprivation and cost is unusual because, as shown in Table 1 the per capita income in Accra is considerably higher, ranging from two to almost three times the level of incomes in the other cities. Such higher incomes should translate into consumption of higher levels of housing services, but in fact, the opposite is happening.
Indeed, for the observed result to occur -i.e., higher levels of income and lower levels of housing services --requires that Ghanaian families must be unable to use their higher incomes to access better housing as would be expected. It suggests, in other words, that the policy impediments in Accra must be much more severe than they are in the other cities.
Table 1. About here
One way to think about the range of policy factors that could affect supply has been developed by Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo (2005) based on the work of Mayer and Somerville (2000) . They provide a clever summary equation, based on the mono-centric city model, that allows broad inferences to be drawn about how elastic a specific city's housing supply curve is relative to other cities, as well as how various policies and natural conditions -such as whether the city is bounded by a coast or not --might affect this elasticity.
The equation suggests that housing supply elasticity, η, is a function of: city population size, n, and a density factor φ. It is also affected by a discount rate, i, the city's population growth rate, g, transportation costs, k, and the price of housing, P, at a fixed point in the city.
(1)
The intuition underlying this equation is that the important factors affecting housing supply elasticity can be broken down into components. That is, the terms in the first bracket on the right hand side measure the size of the city, which, in turn, determines the distance from the city border to its center. In the second bracket is the city's expected growth rate relative to the discount rate, (i-g), divided by the cost of commuting, k. These factors account for how the city's growth will affect the value of a property as well as the discount rate that affects the valuation of the future price increases due to city growth.
Finally, all these factors are scaled by the price of a housing unit that is similarly situated in the different cities.
One can argue about the affects and relative magnitudes of the various policies on relative supply elasticities, including policies possibly not included -such as land market restrictions, or lack of property rights -or topographical conditions, such as Accra's being a coastal city with a resulting inability to grow in all directions, as can Addis Ababa and Nairobi. Nevertheless, the results in Table 1 , and particularly the much higher house prices, lead us to expect the elasticities for the other cities to be considerably higher than is the case in Accra. We examine this hypothesis by using equation (1) To do this, we make use of the results of two recent studies of transport costs in African cities, see World Bank (2002) and (2005), and other city-wide level data on the four cities. Based on this model we can also infer how much Accra's policies have affected the housing supply curve relative to the aggregate estimate. Table 2 reports on our estimates of the various components of equation (1) and the corresponding estimate of the relative housing supply elasticity in each of these cities.
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In a mono-centric model such as the one implied by equation (1) one important factor affecting the supply elasticity is that fact that Accra, unlike Nairobi and Addis Ababa, cannot expand in all directions. Like Dar es Salaam, and many of the U.S.
superstar cities, it is bounded by a coast, restricting the supply of land for a given distance to the central city, implying that for a given population transport costs increase and supply elasticity declines. Thus, topography matters. However, as we show below, it does not dominant policy as the other coastal city, Dar es Salaam, has the highest estimated supply elasticity. Of far more importance are the range of development controls and restrictions, and property rights ambiguities that prevent land development. For example, problems with land administration in Ghana have long been noted, and could certainly be significantly improved upon, see among others Gough and Yankson (2000) . To cite just one example, large holdings of public lands characterize much of Accra, reducing the supply of this already very expensive good, thereby also increasing k and lowering housing supply elasticity. Further, by creating minimum standards-of plot sizes for new housing, for example-that exceed what most people can afford, the regulations have, in effect, created a very high floor price on new housing, as well as much less dense development at the periphery, thereby placing an implicit tax on those who must then commute greater distances. Changing these land use regulations could have highly beneficial effects on both housing prices and commuting costs.
Perhaps as importantly is the inflexibility in redeveloping the city's existing stock of housing. Throughout the world, it is this fixed capital stock that provides most housing services. But in Accra this stock has rarely been recycled into taller buildings in correspondence with the greatly increased value of the land and expanding city boundaries.
13
existing stock of housing; hence, it is very difficult for a private investor to step in, For the most part, there are no unambiguous legal titles to much of the despite the high potential for profits from redevelopment of prime property in the densely populated city core. In other words, due to property title ambiguities in the central city, Accra has at least one of the important characteristics of Gyourko et al's superstar cities -"these markets do not allow for increasing density through construction," p. 3. As a result the existing housing stock is considerably less responsive to demand and as shown by Angel et al (2006) Accra's land area has been growing very rapidly, increasing k in equation (1) and thereby lowering elasticity.
14 The main implication of the supply elasticities inferred from our reliance on equation (1) is that.they indicate that Accra's housing supply elasticity is almost oneseventh that of Dar es Salaam's, about a third of Addis Ababa's, and less than half of Nairobi's. But in order to judge just how elastic or inelastic these relative measures are, 13 See the discussion in The Statesman January 25, 2007 for a discussion of the situation in Accra, and Wheaton (1998) for an analysis of the strong effects that city size and congestion can have on inner city land values and the demand for high rise structures. 14 It is of course very difficult to measure the relative effectiveness of various land management institutions both within and between countries, as shown by Pande and Udry (2005) in their discussion of land use in a number of African economies. One of the advantages of the approach in equation (1) is the factors included are endogenous to the institutions and growth, so that judgments about the relative quality of institutions can be ignored.
we need to have empirical evidence on the cities' supply elasticities or at least the elasticity of one of the cities, estimates which are constrained by data availability. We can, however, follow the approach used by Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) to infer the supply elasticity implied by a reduced form equation of housing market behavior in the four cities. Under this approach we first estimate a housing demand equation of the form:
where R is the log of rent, Y is log of income, HH is household size, and ε is an error term. This specification can be viewed as a traditional logarithmic owner and renter demand equation which closely follows the approach used by Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) in their review of studies of housing demand in 16 countries.
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Based on this model, we estimate the housing demand equations for owners and renters in the four cities, reported in first two equations in Table 3 , i.e., equations (3.1) and (3.2). We also report the results from two other equations in the table, i.e., equations (3.3) and (3.4). These latter equations are reduced form estimates that also take supply factors in each city into account by including dummy variables for the other cities. As our earlier discussion indicated, we expect the policy regimes in the other cities to be relatively more enabling than Accra's. Consequently, we expect the signs of the other city dummy variables -what might be termed supply shifting variables --to have a negative relationship with our dependent variable, rents.
The model is clearly a very simple one and Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) provide considerable detail on both its weaknesses as well as its surprisingly strong performance relative to much less parsimonious approaches. In the end, our model is clearly 16 We use the same definitions for rents and net imputed rents as do Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) , i.e. household expenditure on housing and services.
very simple, but nevertheless, as described in Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) , it is firmly rooted in traditional estimates. .2) ranging from 0.5 to 0.7 for owners and renters, respectively.
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Similarly, in equations (3.3) and (3.4), the variables also have the expected signs, and in this case, all of the additional variables are also statistically significant. Further, the statistical significance of the other variables and the overall equation improve with the adjusted R 2 increasing to 0.86. In addition, in the latter two equations we can place an additional expectation on the findings which is that household size should have a more significant affect on rent levels for renters than it does for owners; this expectation is also fulfilled.
This finding warrants some explanation. We expect household size to be a larger consideration for renters for a number of reasons. Perhaps the main one is the adverse selection problem that can affect rental decisions described by Basu and Emerson (2003) .
According to their analysis, landlords attempt to discriminate between tenants based on household characteristics so as to minimize the costs of tenancy. Having more children is likely, one would think, to imply greater maintenance and upkeep costs for the landlord, and has according to Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) , been more frequently found to be a significant variable in renter rather than in owner demand equations. In addition, Korboe (1992) suggests that in Ghana, owners are subject to cultural obligations that cause them to accept even distant relatives to live rent-free in their houses. Mabogunje (2007) makes a similar argument for other African cities, and Konadu-Agyemany (1991) has an interesting discussion of how these sorts of obligations affect housing choices in Ghana.
Consistent with this result, the most recent Census data indicate that some 22 percent of Ghanaian families do not pay any rent at all. Unlike owners, renters are under no such obligations. Hence, it is more likely that family size has a significant effect on rents paid; consistent with our findings.
These overall results, as well as the coefficients on the dummy variables, support our basic hypothesis: the Accra housing market is, at least for lower income families, much more constrained.
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(2)
In order to get a sense of how much less responsive, we first combine these estimates of income elasticity with previous empirical findings regarding the price elasticity of housing demand to infer an estimate of the underlying overall supply elasticity as depicted by equation (2). where α 2 is the income elasticity of demand as estimated in equations (3.1) and (3.2), γ 1 is the coefficient on income in equations (3.3) and (3.4), and α 1 is the assumed price elasticity of housing demand. Plugging in the estimates for income elasticity from our 19 We attempted to examine whether the dummy variables affected the slope of the supply curve rather than shifted it. However, our estimates were limited by the degrees of freedom. In terms of the effects on low income families recall from footnote 12 and the related text that our surveys are of lower income families in each of the cities. estimated demand equations, and an estimate of a price elasticity of -0.5, based on the literature, yields an overall supply elasticity estimates of about 0.3 for owners and 0.7 for renters. At first glance, these are highly inelastic supply curves, similar to those found by Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) for Malaysia and Korea's restrictive housing markets, and considerably lower than even the lowest U.S. estimates, as found by Green et al (2006) .
However, first glances can be a bit deceiving because this elasticity figure represents a synthetic estimate of the overall supply elasticity for the four cities. While this sort of aggregation is of course impossible as the cities are by no means contiguous or part of the same market, the measure is, in many ways, similar to estimating a national housing supply curve as done, for instance, by Poterba (1991) among others.
When this overall supply elasticity is combined with our estimates of relative elasticities, the results imply that Dar es Salaam's much greater supply elasticity is indeed the case. It is on the order of about 1.5 to 2.0, not unlike estimates for the U.S., see Topel and Sherwin (1988) . On the other hand, they also indicate that Accra's housing supply elasticity is lower than the highly inelastic Asian results noted earlier. 20 One way to think about this result is that if Accra could increase its supply elasticity to the level of Dar es Salaam's, the 20 percent increase in per capita income realized in Ghana over the past seven years would have had virtually no effect on house prices (rather than causing them to increase by 5 percent).
21 20 The elasticity measure for Dar es Salaam comes from multiplying the overall aggregate elasticity measure that we estimated by equation (2) by the city's relative measure, i.e, the results in Table 2 , or 0.7*2.8=2.
In other words, in Dar es Salaam's supply-responsive market, this sort of increase in demand would have had no noticeable effect on house prices.
According to this perspective, at least part of the observed increase in house prices in 21 The price increase is estimated by using the income increase since 2000 and the elasticity estimates for price, income and supply elasticity used in equation (7). We then differentiated house prices with respect to income.
Accra is in effect a regulatory tax on housing supply which redistributes wealth from largely poorer renters to the owners of real estate. While the estimated welfare losses associated with such a tax on the residential real estate component would not be great, on the order of 0.4 percent of GDP, they would still be more than double the size of the city's budget.
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In addition, this regulatory tax almost certainly reduces productivity by slowing the ability to migrate to more productive jobs in the city. This result seems likely for two reasons. First, as shown by Brueckner (1990) among others, the gap between urban and rural incomes is one of the fundamental determinants of urban growth. In Ghana, this gap is not only very large, more than 60 percent, it has also been increasing over time. So too is the income gap between households in Accra and other cities, which is 20 percent.
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Moreover, show that at the same time that the income gap has been growing, urban growth has been slowing to a surprisingly low level, more than 30 percent lower than that of more urbanized neighboring countries, and more than 35 percent lower than the rate in two of our comparator cities.
24 22 This calculation assumes that Accra accounts for about 20 percent of Ghana's GDP and that Ghana follows typical patterns of wealth holdings to GDP ratios of about 1.7 times as much housing/wealth as GDP, see Goldsmith (1984) . It ignores the other fixed capital stock in the city which also confronts this regulatory tax. In this case, the 5 percent transfer to residential real estate property owners embodied in the price increase would be equal to 5 percent of 1.7*GDP*0.2, where the last term stands for Accra's share of GDP, or all together, about 1.7 percent of GDP. Applying the crude deadweight loss formula, 1/2η, where T is the tax rate, and using the previously assumed price elasticity would result in a loss of about one quarter of that amount, about 0.4 percent of GDP. Because Ghana's GDP is approximately $6 billion, this translates into a $24 million deadweight loss. The city of Accra's budget in 2004 was $10 million.
At Ghana's somewhat lower level of urbanization, as shown by Williamson (1988) and Brueckner (1990) , the opposite 23 Of course some significant but unknown share of these higher nominal incomes are offset by higher living costs, and particularly higher housing costs. Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare it to similar gaps in other times and places. Williamson (1988) , for example, reports that the urban-rural wage gap for unskilled relatively homogeneous male workers in England during the Industrial Revolution was about 33 percent. Squire (1981) estimates a similar figure for developing countries at over 40 percent. 24 Ghana's urban growth rate is 30 percent lower than Senegal's, Cote d'Ivoire's, Cameroon, and Nigeria's. On the growth rate for the other comparator cities see Table 3 . Ghana's urban growth rate between 1990-2003 was one-third lower than that of the average of the 24 Sub-Saharan African countries considered by Kessides (2006) even though its share of urban population is close to the average figure. would be expected, even more so since the income differential between cities and the countryside has been increasing. That is, one would expect that urban growth should be higher than that of countries which are already more urbanized. This slowing of the urbanization process can lead to significant reductions in productivity and in costly misallocation of resources. 25 Williamson (1986) , for instance, shows that the deadweight losses implied by the misallocation of resources in nineteenth century with England's much smaller gap may have exceeded 3 percent of GDP.
III. Housing Demand Increases and Housing Prices
Cumulatively, then, Accra's supply elasticity is much lower than the comparator cities. Its elasticity is perhaps even lower than the highly restricted markets Malpezzi and Mayo (2001) documented in Korea and Malaysia 15 years ago. Based on this result we find support for the argument raised at the outset that an increase in housing demand, as would be experienced, for example, by a sharp growth in remittances or an improvement in access to finance, could have a strong effect on house prices. Can we say anything more than this? Do we, in fact, find that housing market regulations and land administration policies in Accra create the sorts of price pressures on nontradables that Taylor (2006) suggests may be a drag on productivity? While data limitations prevent an unambiguous answer to this question, we can use the basic model to at least provide a qualified perspective on how much remittances might have mattered for resource allocation and distributional questions.
For example, as a thought experiment, consider the effects that further improvements in the provision of housing finance could have on the Accra real estate 25 The increase in urban unemployment would seem to contradict this argument. However, in a city with so much informal sector activity this variable is extremely difficult to measure with any accuracy.
market. One way of thinking about the effects of this sort of changed economic environment in terms of equation (1) would be to differentiate η with respect to i,
showing that dη/di < 0, and inferring by how much the improvement in access to finance would affect in the first instance, housing demand, and in the second the supply elasticity of housing.
Similarly, if remittances are anything like the level they appear to be, then they would have an effect on both housing demand and supply elasticity like that of lowering financing costs. Such effects would certainly help create more housing and importantly, related jobs. At the same time, however, they would also contribute to significant house price increases, and in so doing they would almost certainly contribute to slower migration to the city. That is, while much more detailed empirical analysis is needed, our results suggest that Accra's housing market has many of the symptoms of a superstar cities. It certainly has inelastic housing supply and topographical restrictions on how it can develop; it also seems to be experiencing an inflow of higher income families -from the Diaspora --who appear to find other Ghanaian cities less than perfect substitutes for Accra; and finally, it has very high house prices. As a result, it should come as no surprise that Accra is suffering many of the problems that affect superstar cities.
IV. Conclusions
As has long been noted, Accra's housing market appears to be a focal point for the investment of remittances. However, we do not know the dimensions or scale of these flows. Hence, an important first step is to develop this sort of information. Nevertheless, even without it, our results point to a policy regime that could weaken Ghana's ability to achieve the higher, more equitable rates of growth pointed to by Vision 2020 and the Noguchi Statement.
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Further, the policy-constrained housing market may also contribute to expectations of further capital gains on housing investments in Accra which could divert private investment to housing rather than other sectors which could, for instance, help increase Ghana's manufacturing base. Finally, by increasing the housing costs of the poor, they also limit the ability of these investments to further the large gains in poverty reduction that have been realized in Accra. Certainly, given these possible larger, economy-wide effects further, more detailed empirical analysis of these effects seems warranted.
If a very inelastic housing supply elasticity is constraining the positive effects of possible rural-urban migration on growth, as it appears to be the case, then Arthur Lewis' concern with the high cost of urbanization may well be constraining growth. In other words, the price effects of policy-induced reductions in supply elasticity can have significant effects on resource allocation and income distribution. 
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